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Abstract  
Southeast European countries start from a different point in the transition to the European Green Deal 
and face systemic challenges in their energy markets and in implementing the EU’s energy acquis. These 
issues could be addressed through a more regionally focused approach.  
This report looks at three countries that in the past have typified a region sometimes seen as reluctant 
to embrace this transition: Bulgaria, Greece and Romania. The analysis considers the status of their 
wholesale and retail markets; interconnectivity and market coupling; the independence of national 
regulatory authorities, and the obstacles to the adopting the energy acquis.  
Six main barriers might prevent more integrated and efficient markets in the region: i) high dependence 
on fossil fuels, often supported by policy, ii) market concentration and state intervention, iii) illiquid 
markets, iv) occasional poor interconnectivity and cross-border energy trade, v) poor regulatory 
framework and institutional design, and vi) strategies for managing the transition.  
The combination of carbon-intensive energy sectors, relatively low energy efficiency, and below-EU 
average GDP per capita makes the transformation – of the coal regions, for example – both technically 
challenging and politically sensitive. The European Green Deal and the ‘just transition’ offer new 
opportunities for the region (including Covid-19 recovery funds) to develop lower carbon energy 
systems. But cash injections alone will not be sufficient. This report argues that the region requires 
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1. Introduction 
With its ambition for decarbonisation by 2050, the European Green Deal, presented by the 
European Commission at the end of 2019,1 envisages a profound transformation of the 
economy. Achieving climate neutrality on the European continent will, for a start, require a 
sensible balance between risks and opportunities across member states and regions, and more 
importantly, significant financial resources to ensure a ‘just energy transition’.2 As a result, the 
European Commission has proposed the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, including a Just 
Transition Mechanism and a Just Transition Fund, with the aim to leave no person or place 
behind. The European Commission acknowledges that the transition can only succeed if it is 
conducted in a fair and inclusive way, which should be reflected in policy. Following the Covid-
19 economic crisis, the EU, as well as individual member states, will unleash considerable 
financial aid through a plethora of both existing and new instruments. A consensus is now 
emerging among the European institutions and the large majority of member states believes 
that the bulk of these EU emergency and recovery funds should reflect decarbonisation of the 
economy as pursued through the European Green Deal.3  
This report looks at Bulgaria, Greece and Romania as representative examples of southeast 
European countries (SEE) that are also EU member states. While each has unique 
circumstances, there are many similarities with other EU and Energy Community member 
states in central and eastern Europe (CEE), most of which have been grouped under the Central 
and South Eastern Europe energy connectivity (CESEC) framework.4 As with other SEE member 
states, the three countries discussed often face issues of a structural nature. These include the 
reliance on the lignite and coal prevalent in the region, and the associated difficulties of 
 
1 European Commission (2019), The European Green Deal COM(2019) 640 final, Brussels (https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1576150542719&uri=COM%3A2019%3A640%3AFIN).  
2 B. K. Sovacool, M. Martiskainen, A. Hook and L. Baker (2019), “Decarbonization and Its Discontents: a Critical 
Energy Justice Perspective on Four Low-carbon Transitions”, Climatic Change Vol. 155, pp. 581–619. 
3 “Every euro we invest must flow into a new economy rather than old structures. We must avoid that at all costs”, 
as stated by Frans Timmermans.  
4 Central and South Eastern Europe energy connectivity (CESEC) initiative was set up in February 2015 and includes 
EU member states Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia and Energy 
Community members Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia, the Republic of North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo (in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence) 
and Montenegro. 
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reducing this dependence:5 concerns about security of supply, the level of electricity prices, the 
expected regional and social implications of the transition, and a lack of transparency. The 
situation is further complicated by regulatory uncertainty, political risks, and a variety of 
persistent energy market barriers, including the slow coupling of power markets, lack of 
infrastructure and the absence of robust price signals in illiquid hubs.  
Incomplete market reforms will continue to hinder private investment,6 new energy solutions 
and the delivery of the necessary physical interconnections across the countries that are 
needed for implementing the electricity and gas target models, thereby slowing down or 
rendering more difficult the inevitable transition to a lower carbon energy system. It is hard to 
see how, in the absence of functioning national and regional energy markets, the energy 
transition and the European Green Deal can be successfully implemented in a cost-effective 
way in the region. For example, without a functioning energy market, carbon pricing typically 
means higher costs but few incentives to reduce emission. This translates into higher than 
necessary power prices or accumulated debts by industry.  
Numerous steps have been taken in the EU to make the market fit for the low-carbon future, 
starting with the Third Energy Package, the formulation of network codes and the Clean Energy 
Package.7 Enabled by the high-level political steering built into projects, the CESEC initiative, 
established in February 2015, has been instrumental in furthering infrastructure development 
and reducing vulnerability, encouraging more regulatory convergence. In the context of the 
European Green Deal and the Covid-19 recovery funds, the success of CESEC raises the question 
as to how the lessons from this framework can be adapted for current circumstances. CESEC 
could maintain its current focus on natural gas, electricity markets, renewables and energy 
efficiency, or perhaps be transformed into a (central and) southeast European climate group or 
initiative. This could focus on ‘just transition’ projects involving the kind of industry 
participation that has been notably instrumental in the success of CESEC. Regional actors would 
be more effectively engaged and regional challenges more closely targeted, thus providing an 
additional driver for the ‘just transition’ of the European Green Deal in a manner that could be 
better aligned with the region’s needs.  
 
5 To date, with the notable exception of Greece, where 12 coal-fired units are planned to be switched off by 2023. 
For more details see A. (2019),  “UPDATE 2-Greece's PPC wants to speed up coal phase-out, boost renewables by 
2024”, Reuters, 16 December (https://www.reuters.com/article/public-power-plan-ceo/update-2-greeces-ppc-
wants-to-speed-up-coal-phase-out-boost-renewables-by-2024-idUSL8N28Q1RN). 
6 See for example, European Commission (2020), “Country Report Bulgaria 2020, Accompanying the document”, 
Commission Staff Document, SWD (2020) 501, Brussels. 
7 The Third Energy Package established a level playing field for market participants and provided benchmarks for 
market functioning in gas and electricity markets across the EU. Network Codes specify detailed rules for cross-
border market operations, including capacity allocation, tariffs for entry-exit zones and interoperability. In turn, 
the Energy Union gradually aimed at breaking up the silo mentality of the energy sector. Among others, the new 
electricity market design was approved within the Clean Energy Package during the tenure of the last Commission. 
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Whatever form such an initiative takes, by dealing with decarbonisation opportunities and risks, 
it would ensure that SEE countries are not left behind as the European Green Deal is 
implemented. There would be several benefits.  
1. It could function as a reality check on how market reforms could be finalised in the region, 
thus acknowledging the different starting positions of SEE countries.  
2. As with CESEC, it could facilitate communication between the European Commission, 
national governments, regional authorities and – crucially – industry stakeholders for both 
energy market reforms and the development of decarbonisation strategies. Better 
alignment with the national energy and climate plans (NECPs) in the region should 
contribute to the success of the new governance regulation framework. 
3. A high-level forum could reinforce the stakeholder consultations foreseen under the 
NECPs, from utility companies to non-governmental organisations and industry, whose 
commitment and cooperation are paramount for delivering market reforms and 
decarbonisation solutions.  
4. It would offer a high-level political forum for linking the market perspective, as that taken 
under CESEC, to the ‘just transition’ and the European Green Deal.  
5. It could constitute a hub for dealing with coal regions, where additional stress8 caused by 
the Covid-19 crisis potentially risks being tackled with calls to relax environmental and 
climate obligations. This report highlights the current market structures in Bulgaria, Greece 
and Romania, and identifies the most significant barriers to functional energy markets. In 
many respects, these countries are considered laggards in the EU in terms of energy 
market integration. At the same time, each country faces unique challenges that reflect 
the complexity of the region and begs the question of the necessity for individually tailored 
responses while complementing a regional approach. These countries have largely failed 
so far to deliver market reforms and will face the double challenge of both overcoming 
their market deficiencies and developing decarbonisation strategies for their fossil fuel-
dependent economies. Addressing the decarbonisation agenda will require substantial 
political commitments and economic resources and an understanding of the implications, 
but also of the opportunities of the Covid-19 crisis both in the EU and the region.   
 
The countries are analysed by examining their wholesale and retail markets for electricity and 
natural gas, the independence of their national regulatory agencies (NRAs), their level of 
interconnectivity and market coupling, and also the challenges they have faced implementing 
the Third Energy Package and the target models.  
A better functioning and more transparent market would offer many benefits in return, for 
example energy security, industrial development, jobs and better air quality. At the same time 
the examined countries and the region at large have significant potential not just for wind or 
 
8 C. Egenhofer, J. Núñez Ferrer, I. Kustova and J. Popov (2020), “The Moment for Rapid Re-development for Coal 
Regions is Now”, CEPS Policy Insight 2020-13, CEPS, Brussels, May.  
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solar, but also for bio-economy solutions, in addition to an existing qualified engineering 
workforce or available land from depleted mining or other activities.  
The report also makes a set of suggestions for the design of a dedicated regional cooperation 
framework that could reinforce the efforts for market liberalisation and enable the transition 
towards climate neutrality.  
The data is based on primary and secondary sources including Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) reports, commissioned consultancy studies, national reports of the 
three countries, European Commission evaluations, and informal stakeholder consultations. 
2. Principal barriers to functioning energy markets and regulatory frameworks  
This report identifies six main barriers to the energy transition that might prevent more 
integrated and efficient markets in the region. Individual country analyses follow the cross-
country summary below.   
High dependence on fossil fuels, often supported by policy 
All three countries rely to a great extent on fossil fuels for power generation, mainly lignite and 
some hard coal. The timely phasing out of solid fossil fuel power plants would require 
substantial financial resources and strategic planning that are currently lacking in the region. In 
addition to the challenge posed by the reliance on fossil fuels to the decarbonisation 
perspectives, the significant share of natural gas that is largely covered by imports (especially 
in the cases of Bulgaria and Greece)9 raises concerns about security of supply in the region, 
particularly in light of the limited level of interconnectedness. 
Market concentration and state intervention 
In all three countries, the final retail prices in electricity and gas are subject to a variety of 
regulations and price interventions. The countries have either regulated or parallel markets 
with constraints on choice of suppliers, usually exhibiting low levels of competition. Regulated 
and (potentially) non-cost-reflective retail prices that do not fully cover wholesale prices have 
been reported in Romania for electricity and Bulgaria for gas,10 whereas in Greece the 
electricity market is dominated by one player and there is state intervention in electricity 
tariffs.11 Difficulties in market entry overlap with incomplete unbundling and high market 
concentration in both gas and electricity markets, with limited sources of supply for gas and 
 
9 However, Greece appears more diversified in terms of upstream gas supply, particularly following the expansion 
of the Revithoussa LNG Terminal.  
10 The average mark up over the 2012-2018 period were negative “because the energy component of the retail 
prices was set at a level below wholesale energy costs”. ACER (2019), Market Monitoring Report 2018 – Electricity 
and Gas Retail Markets Volume, p. 23 
11 See National Report 2019, by the Greek Regulatory Authority for Energy and the Monthly Report by EnEx. In 
certain market segments such as consumers directly connected to the HV grid, the PPC is still a monopoly. 
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with inflexible legacy long-term contracts. Although unbundling has been formally introduced 
in all three countries, markets remain largely oligopolistic.  
Illiquid markets 
Illiquid markets exhibit skewed price signals for both electricity and natural gas. While there are 
some signs for further trading activity, additional work towards the implementation of network 
codes is still needed to introduce all the building blocks of a functioning hub system.12 For 
natural gas, markets are considered illiquid, and a number of barriers persist, such as non-
transparent transmission tariffs. In the past these have often been too high,13 although there 
has been recent progress. The lack of a national or regional exchange and/or of a functioning 
virtual trading platform, and insufficient or absent regulatory transparency, continue to impede 
the adequate functioning of markets. However, although the situation appears largely 
pessimistic, ACER noticed an increasing transactional activity on ad hoc platforms in Romania.14 
Poor interconnectivity and cross-border energy trade 
A low level of infrastructure interconnections and artificial cross-border trade distortions 
remain one of the principal problems in the region. Bottlenecks in gas markets persist, which 
lead to the development of a number of disconnected isolated markets, raising issues of 
security of supply. More work is needed to ensure the implementation of security of supply 
provisions of EU Regulation 2017/1938 to pursue more coordination of measures to address 
crises.15 While the completion of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) and the planned 
Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria increase the interconnectivity in the region, gas markets 
remain largely fragmented. In electricity, weak or absent virtual reverse flows and cross-border 
cooperation between transmission system operators (TSOs) directly inhibit the implementation 
of the Clean Energy Package, an initiative that explicitly promotes cross-border cooperation 
and a more regional approach to resource adequacy, especially for addressing crisis 
situations.16 Price distortions such as an export levy, an entry tariff or supplier levies aimed at 
balancing the renewable energy account (in the form of wholesale market uplifts) also have 
history in the region. This could not only distort cross-border trade but also affect the efficiency 
of the electricity system, resulting in a reduction of overall economic efficiency of market 
operation. A more integrated market including – as far as possible – neighbouring countries 
such as Turkey would address such shortcomings. 
 
12 ACER (2017), First ACER Implementation Monitoring Report of the Network Code on Interoperability and Data 
Exchange.  
13 ACER Kantor Study (2017), Barriers to Gas Wholesale Trading, Final Report, p. 50. 
14 ACER (2019), Market Monitoring Report 2018 – Gas Wholesale Market Volume, p. 35. 
15 J. Bowden (2019), “SE Europe Gas Markets: Towards Integration”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 150, 
p. 5. (https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/se-europe-gas-markets-towards-integration/?v=d3dcf429c679). 
16 C. Egenhofer and C. Stroia (2017), “Is security of energy supply possible without deeper cross-border market 
integration? Lessons from the cold spell in South-Eastern Europe”, CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017/45, December 
(https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/security-energy-supply-possible-without-deeper-cross-border-market-
integration-lessons/). 
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Poor regulatory framework and institutional design 
Independence and capacity of regulatory agencies are essential for an adequately functioning 
energy sector, given their role for imposing obligations on entities with substantial market 
power.17 In the region, despite existing legal formalities, there remains an “institutional comfort 
with existing market structure”18 and greater independence of regulators remains to be 
ensured in line with ACER recommendations.19 Various political crises and the reluctance of 
governments to address these issues persist in the region, inhibiting the completion of 
infrastructure projects. A high level of political unpredictability dominates the regulatory 
environment. 
Managing the transition  
While countries in the SEE region have attempted market reforms at various times and to 
different degrees, distributional issues remain politically sensitive and salient. The political 
reluctance to take concrete transition measures, such as the phase-down/out of lignite, reflects 
concerns about social risks and limited economic opportunities prevalent in carbon-dependent 
regions. Decarbonisation and market liberalisation will inevitably put pressure on subsidised 
retail prices. The subsidised prices are still perceived as a social right and consequently 
represent a highly contentious political question. Price interventions (aside from protecting 
genuinely vulnerable consumers) distort the market and compromise market signals, which are 
meant to underpin investment. Additional geopolitical concerns related to security of supply 
reinforce domestic scepticism towards a higher openness of energy markets. When combined 
with nationally specific, highly sensitive socio-political issues, such as vexation with debt-fuelled 
recession in Greece, and angst over major industrial closures reminiscent of those in post-1990 
Romania, these factors mean that significant pressure for inaction is exerted on domestic 
decision makers. With the exception of some more recent developments in Greece, clear and 
rigorous energy and climate strategies addressing these perceptions have so far been missing 
in the region. 
An additional potential challenge: the impact of the coronavirus crisis 
The current Covid-19 pandemic, which has halted EU mobility and industrial production, 
threatens to reinforce many of the existing barriers to energy market functioning and 
decarbonisation in the region. There are mixed signals. On one hand, for example, the first vice 
president of the Romanian ruling party asked all Romanian MEPs to support the abandonment 
of the European Green Deal and the diversion of funds to national economies and health 
systems. Romania has also imposed a price ceiling on utility prices in response to the 
coronavirus. In the name of dealing with the immediate effects of the crisis, liberalisation 
 
17 P. Alexiadis and C. M. da Silva Pereira Neto (2019), “Competing Architectures for Regulatory and Competition 
Law Governance”, Florence School of Regulation (https://fsr.eui.eu/ensuring-the-independence-of-regulators/). 
18 Julian Bowden (2019), op.cit., p. 5.  
19 ACER (2016), ACER Recommendations on ensuring the independence of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators and of national regulatory authorities, 01-2016; Enhanced Surveillance Report, Greece, June 2019. 
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calendars could be scrapped, energy exports restricted, and significant political pressure 
exerted on NRAs. The danger is that measures adopted over the following months could cause 
long-lasting damage to the development of functioning energy markets and the 
decarbonisation of the economies of the SEE region.  
On the other hand, ministers from eight member states, including Estonia, Greece, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland (some of which have very carbon-intensive electricity sectors) have 
explicitly asked the European Commission through a letter to focus on renewable energy value 
chains for unlocking new investment potential following the Covid-19 crisis. In another letter, 
alongside Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain, the governments of Bulgaria, 
Greece and Romania (the three SEE states analysed in this report) have called for the “speeding 
up the decarbonisation of the European industry through the European Green Deal” and the 
financing of green projects by “focusing on green technologies and solutions”.20 The recent 
European Commission report21 is showing the way by identifying various transition 
opportunities related to renewables. Renewable energy offers European countries the 
potential to develop industrial value chains and the promise of retaining industrial capacity 
linked to the carbon neutral transformation. It may also offer manufacturing opportunities now 
located outside Europe, with CEE member states especially well placed for this.  
3. Bulgaria 
Despite recent progress in market opening, Bulgaria still lacks functioning liberalised electricity 
and gas markets. Both markets are formally unbundled, but are currently dominated by state-
owned companies belonging to the same group, and the power exchange is embryonic. For 
natural gas, the country depends almost completely on imports from a single supplier, which, 
combined with gas infrastructure limitations, exposes the country to security of supply risks.22 
Electricity is produced predominantly at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), several 
publicly and privately held lignite plants,23 as well as privately owned solar and wind farms. 
Some of the lignite plants are old and highly polluting, but potential closures remain a politically 
and socially sensitive issue. Domestic mining offers relative job security for the population in 
 
20 Joint Statement welcoming the European Commission’s Industrial Strategy, 10 March 2020, 
(https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/joint-statement-welcoming-the-european-commission-s-industrial-strategy). 
21 For solar alone, see K. Bódis et al (2019), “Solar Photovoltaic Electricity Generation: A Lifeline for the European 
Coal Regions in Transition”, Sustainability 2019, Vol. 11, 3703, (https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/13/3703). 
22 The Residual Supply Index (RSI) of Bulgaria is one of the lowest in the EU, approaching 4% in 2016. The RSI determines 
the relationship between the sum of the supply capabilities of all suppliers except the largest source – and total demand 
in the market. If at any given time the RSI is equal to or greater than 1 (i.e. 100 %), the largest supplier can be replaced 
because the supply capability of all other suppliers is sufficient to meet demand. ACER (2015), European Gas Target 
Model –review and update. Annex 3. Calculation Specification for Wholesale Market Metrics.  
23 It must be acknowledged that some facilities have either been more recently commissioned or have undergone 
significant environmental refurbishments, resulting in less polluting production.  
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the mining regions and there are no immediate plans to close mines or lignite plants. Regular 
public demonstrations show that the sector is still important to Bulgarian citizens.24 
Derogations and financial support for many coal power plants are usually justified by security 
of supply and social impact concerns.25 So the derogation provided in accordance with the ETS 
directive, which will continue – albeit with amendments – through phase IV, may leave room 
for the continued operation of coal plants. However, the new Regulation for EU Electricity 
Market Design imposes stricter emissions limits, for example on capacity mechanisms, so the 
country will need to address the future of coal-fired plants. This corresponds with the situation 
of the Maritsa East 2 coal power plant, the Balkan’s biggest, which is losing large amounts of 
money. In 2019 alone, it reported a loss of over €100 million, bringing the accumulated loss to 
over €410 million. The loss for the first quarter of 2020 alone was €32 million. Combined with 
the fact that Bulgaria has good potential for hydro storage as well as wind and solar, which 
could replace lignite, the draft NECP’s reluctance to address a phase-out of lignite beyond 
203026 seems surprising. 
Regular governmental interventions and changes in the regulatory environment have reduced 
the stability in the energy sector and caused private investors to hold back from entering the 
Bulgarian energy market.27 The export ban for Bulgarian electricity during the early 2017 cold 
spell is an example of how short-term government intervention undermines the working of 
markets and regional interconnections.28 
Wholesale markets 
The highly regulated Bulgarian electricity market is dominated by a few major players. The 
National Electricity Company EAD (NEK)29 and the Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH), a state-
owned company, owns, among others, the Maritsa East 2 lignite-fired power plant and the 
Kozloduy NPP. There are also several private thermal plants, including AES Galabovo, also 
known as Maritsa East 1, owned and operated by AES Corporation, and Maritsa East 3, with a 
 
24 Novinite (2013), “Thousands of Miners Rally for Protest in Bulgarian Capital Sofia”, 5 March, 
(https://www.novinite.com/articles/148404/Thousands+of+Miners+Rally+for+Protest+in+Bulgarian+Capital+ 
Sofia) Financial Post (2018), “Bulgarian miners protest to demand job security, 29 November,  
(https://business.financialpost.com/news/bulgarian-miners-protest-to-demand-job-security). 
25 G. Kondarev (2017), “Will the EU move at the pace of its slowest members?”, Euractiv, 28 April, 
(https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/opinion/will-the-eu-move-at-the-pace-of-its-slowest-members/) 
Association of Traders with Electricity in Bulgaria (2019), “Large electricity consumers will be subsidized from the 
revenues for emission allowances”, 25 October, (https://ateb.bg). 
26 Summary of the Commission assessment of the draft National Energy and Climate Plan 2021-2030, p. 3. 
27 European Commission (2020), “Country Report Bulgaria 2020, Accompanying the document” Commission Staff 
Document, SWD (2020) 501, Brussels. 
28 C. Egenhofer and C. Stroia (2017) op. cit. 
29 NEK is part of Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) and historically last resort supplier and coordinator of special 
balancing groups. It owns 80% of hydropower plants in the country. 
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majority share owned by Contour Global. The distribution grid is privatised and maintained by 
three distribution system operators: CEZ, Energo-Pro and EVN.  
The wholesale market is a structured institution that functions as a regulated and free market 
in parallel, with clear limitations in terms of choice and competitive pressures. The government 
committed to spot markets (day-ahead and intra-day) in 2016, following the European 
Commission’s investigation, and the Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange (IBEX) was 
created. Volumes trading on IBEX have been gradually increasing and represent about 30% of 
the total load in 2020.30 
In recent years, the electricity market in Bulgaria has been undergoing changes, including the 
introduction of new rules for renewable energy producers, the abolition of the electricity 
export levy, and market coupling projects with neighbouring countries. In April 2019, Bulgaria 
adopted a set of amendments to the Energy Act, which entered into force on 1 July 2019. One 
of the requirements was that all renewable energy producers with a capacity from 1 MW to 4 
MW sell their electricity on the free market, freeing about 750 MW to the market.31 This is a 
step towards market opening; prior to this electricity was bought by NEK and sold on the 
regulated market.  
Renewable energy producers with 1 MW to 4 MW capacity are selling the produced energy at 
market prices on the IBEX and are being compensated for the difference between the 
‘reference price’ determined by the regulator for each regulatory period (from 1 July to 30 
June) and the preferential prices granted in 2010, 2011 and 2012 (which is paid by a special 
state energy security fund). A similar scheme was also approved in 2018 to send all renewable 
capacity above 4 MW to the free market, in exchange for a contract for premium. Additionally, 
the abolition of the export levy since July 2019 of around €5/MWh has facilitated electricity 
exports.  
The Bulgarian gas demand is relatively small (around 3-3.5 bcm/year, which amounts to around 
13% in the energy mix) and highly concentrated with almost all volumes contracted under long-
term contracts. However, new opportunities are emerging including LNG supplies via Greece. 
Until now, opening the domestic gas market faced continuous resistance from the Bulgarian 
authorities, who cited energy security issues,32 quarterly prices set by the regulator, and regular 
interventions. The share of the dominant supplier remains high at 89%. Bulgartransgaz, the 
transmission system operator, applied interim measures between 2015 and 2019 in response 
 
30 IBEX (2020), “Day-ahead market March 2020”, March (http://www.ibex.bg/bin/documents/1286_file.pdf). 
31 There are 372 plants ranging between 1 MW and 4 MW, half of which are solar, with a total installed capacity 
of 750 MW. This accounts for around 7% of available capacity and 5% of total installed capacity in the country. 
32 In December 2018, the European Commission imposed a €77 million fine on the state-owned Bulgarian Energy 
Holding (BEH) company for blocking access to key natural gas infrastructure in the country.  See G. Gotev (2018), 
“Fact-check: Did EU gas liberalisation rules put Bulgaria’s national security at risk?”, Euractiv, 20 December 
(https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/factcheck-did-eu-gas-liberalisation-rules-put-bulgarias-
national-security-at-risk/). 
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to the share of the dominant supplier, market size, the structure of gas imports, and lack of 
diversification.  
In 2019, some further changes were implemented. The Gas Release Programme was developed 
as part of the energy sector reforms. Accordingly, the public supplier is obliged to offer certain 
volumes of natural gas through the organised gas market: 7% in 2020, rising to 35% in 2024.33 
Public consultations on a gas trading platform were organised in the autumn of 2019 and on 9 
December the first auction was held. These changes may be explained, inter alia, by the 
country’s aspirations to become a regional gas hub. Thus, in 2019, the concept of the Bulgarian 
Gas Hub was elaborated and amendments to reform the gas market towards greater opening 
were adopted. 
Retail markets 
In theory, companies and households are eligible to purchase electricity from the liberalised 
market, but in reality there are multiple barriers to consumers buying electricity on the free 
market. Moreover, since the prices on the regulated market are lower, there are few incentives 
to move to the free market. Full market liberalisation remains a hot social and political issue, 
because the retail market and end-user price deregulation could also increase price volatility, 
possibly provoking protests and strikes against a price increase, as has happened in the past.34  
In the household retail sector, NEK, a subsidiary of state-owned Bulgarian Energy Holding, 
supplies nearly 100% of households; additionally, the three top suppliers in the non-residential 
sector hold around 80% of market share. The non-household retail sector has seen market 
opening with around 52% of non-household demand served under freely negotiated prices in 
2016. Even this segment, however, shows high levels of concentration and limited competition.  
NRA independence 
In the past year, Bulgaria has implemented several reforms in the energy sector. Some of the 
measures aimed for the regulator to become independent of government influence by shifting 
the power to appoint the agency’s senior staff from the prime minister to the parliament.35 
With the idea of reflecting the strengthened independence of the energy regulator, the State 
Energy and Water Regulation Commission (SEWRC) was renamed the Energy and Water 
Regulation Commission (EWRC). However, while the amendments provide more independence 




33 Association of Traders with Electricity in Bulgaria (2019), “EWRC organizes a public consultation on the natural 
gas trading platform”, 6 November (https://ateb.bg/). 
34 G. Gotev (2018), “Power grid sale upsets Bulgarian, Czech governments”, Euractiv, 28 February, 
(https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/power-grid-sale-upsets-bulgarian-czech-governments/). 
35 S. Carney (2014), “Bulgaria’s Interim Cabinet Plans Energy-Regulator Reform”, The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 
(https://www.wsj.com/articles/bulgarias-interim-cabinet-plans-energy-regulator-reform-1412783469). 
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Interconnectivity and market coupling 
The Bulgaria electricity interconnection is above the 2020 target of 10%. A prospective new line 
to Greece will increase this cross-border capacity. The abolition of the export levy from July 
2019 may enable exports to neighbouring markets. In 2019, TSOs from Bulgaria, North 
Macedonia and Albania signed a memorandum of understanding envisaging day-ahead market 
coupling.36 In February 2019, Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia initiated a trilateral power market 
coupling project. This has the potential to substantially increase interconnections by addressing 
the kind of shortcomings exposed for example during the cold spell of early 2017, when the 
countries in the region acted unilaterally and with little coordination.37 A key challenge will be 
to advance the market coupling with Romania and other CEE countries.  
The Bulgarian gas market has always been rather isolated, but the country has been a transit 
route for Russia’s supplies to Turkey. The new Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria, which has been 
pending for many years, should finally become operational by 2020.38 While a low adequacy of 
gas interconnection with neighbouring countries persists, the CESEC initiative has unlocked 
several projects, including the reinforcement of the Bulgarian gas grid and the opening in 2016 
of reverse flows from Greece that has enabled supplies to be imported from Revithoussa LNG 
terminal in Greece.39 In light of these new opportunities, Bulgaria decided to acquire 20% of 
the LNG terminal near Alexandroupolis in Greece.40 The TurkStream project, designed as an 
alternative to the disbanded South Stream, is meant to become operational in the early 2020s. 
It offers an alternative route to supplies from Russia, and reverse flows on the TransBalkan 
pipeline, and would add flexibility in the future. With an ambition to establish the Balkan Gas 
Hub, the concept for the construction of the gas distribution centre was developed in January 
2019, aiming to create an electronic platform for hosting a variety of transactions.41 Progress 
on this will depend on, among other things, developments regarding TurkStream.  
Obstacles to implementation 
Although Bulgaria formally transposed the Third Energy Package into national legislation, 
genuine market reforms have faced numerous obstacles and drawbacks. Despite all the 
commitments, Bulgaria was reluctant to facilitate reforms and only acted in response to the 
 
36 Balkan Green Energy News (2019), “Bulgaria scraps electricity export fee, enabling market coupling with North 
Macedonia”, 14 May (https://balkangreenenergynews.com/bulgaria-scraps-electricity-export-fee-enabling-
market-coupling-with-north-macedonia/). 
37 C. Egenhofer and C. Stroia (2017), op.cit. 
38 Euractiv (2019), “Bulgaria says it will be gas independent from Russia in 2020”, 12 November, 
(https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/bulgaria-says-it-will-be-gas-independent-from-russia-in-2020/) 
The interconnection agreement between DESFA and Bulgartransgaz on the existing pipeline was only signed on 
June 28th 2016, as a result of the strong involvement of CESEC.  
39 Lngunlimited (2020), “Bulgaria Emerges as Europe’s Latest LNG Buyer”, 15 January 
(https://lngunlimited.com/bulgaria-emerges-as-europes-latest-lng-buyer/). 
40 BNT News (2020), “Bulgaria buys 20% of the shares of LNG terminal near Alexandroupolis”, 8 January 
(https://www.bnt.bg/en/a/bulgaria-buys-20-of-the-shares-of-the-lng-terminal-near-alexandroupolis). 
41 EWRC (2019). National Report to the European Commission (Summary), July 2019. 
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European Commission’s inquiries. In 2015, the BEH Group was investigated about abusing its 
dominant position on the market for the wholesale supply of electricity on the non-regulated 
market.42 The BEH Group committed to offer certain volumes of electricity on an independent 
power exchange, IBEX, which became operational in 2016. In 2018, the European Commission 
fined the BEH Group for breaching EU antitrust rules by blocking access to gas infrastructure 
and continuing to abuse its dominant market position.43 This was met with resistance from the 
Bulgarian government to paying the fine, as well as refusing the Commission request that, 
according to the Bulgarian government, would have led to the privatisation of Bulgartransgaz.44 
NEK was also sanctioned for abusing its dominance on the balancing market for renewables.45 
In early 2020, the Bulgarian Commission for Protection of Competition (BCPC) issued a fine for 
unfair trading conditions for renewables producers. It found that NEK unilaterally and 
unjustifiably modified the hourly forecast schedules submitted by renewables energy 
producers, who are members of the special balancing group of NEK, and allocated additional 
unreasonable costs for imbalances to them.46 
In July 2019, the European Commission decided to refer Bulgaria to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) for its poor air quality record in south eastern Bulgaria, where the 
largest thermal power plants in Bulgaria are located.47 
Barriers for investments in new renewable projects still date from past retroactive measures. 
The 5% turnover tax for energy producers, which was introduced in 2013 to balance the energy 
system financially, remains in place. Similarly, a 5% revenue also applies for all new energy 
investment projects. Removal, ideally for new and existing projects, will stimulate new 
merchant renewables projects, essentially for self-consumption and all financed without 
subsidies. 
 
42 European Commission (2015), Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by Bulgarian Energy Holding to open 
up Bulgarian wholesale electricity market, Press Release, 10 December (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6289). 
43 European Commission (2018), Antitrust: Commission fines BEH Group €77 million for blocking access to key 
natural gas infrastructure in Bulgaria, Press Release, 17 December (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6846). 
44 G. Gotev (2018), “Fact-check: Did EU gas liberalisation rules put Bulgaria’s national security at risk?”, Euractiv, 
20 December (https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/factcheck-did-eu-gas-liberalisation-rules-put-
bulgarias-national-security-at-risk/). 
45 E. Mateina and A. Grunova (2020), “The Bulgarian National Electricity Company sanctioned for abuse of 
dominance on the market of balancing energy of renewables”, Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 7 January 
(http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2020/01/07/the-bulgarian-national-electricity-company-
sanctioned-for-abuse-of-dominance-on-the-market-of-balancing-energy-of-renewables/). 
46 https://energypost.eu/the-balkans-biggest-power-station-why-thinking-beyond-maritsa-east-2-matters/  
47 European Commission (2019), July infringements package: key decisions, 25 July 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_19_4251). 
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4. Greece 
Compared to other EU member states, Greece has a relatively isolated energy system that lags 
behind in terms of connectivity to the regional energy markets. Greece covers about 10% of its 
aggregated consumption through imports, a share that can rise as high as 25% at times because 
of the price differences between Greece and the rest of SEE. The country experienced severe 
delays of over five years in implementing the gas and electricity target models, which are now 
expected to be implemented in 2020.48 Currently, Greece lacks functioning intra-day, forward 
and balancing markets for electricity and has no balancing market for natural gas. The energy-
related provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2015 with the 
European Commission were designed to overcome such deficiencies in the adoption of EU 
legislation and market design. 
Many of the challenges faced by the Greek energy markets stem from the high market 
concentration in the power sector (until recently also in the natural gas sector). The electricity 
market is dominated by the state-owned Public Power Corporation (PPC), which exerts quasi-
monopolistic control over both the wholesale and retail markets. PPC accounts for about 50% 
of electricity generation49 and approximately 70% of the retail market.50 Some have claimed 
that the reluctance of Greek authorities to adopt meaningful market reforms can be attributed, 
to a certain extent, to the desire to protect the dominance of the PPC company and the low 
prices of electricity that it offers for the population.51 Nonetheless, the market share of PPC is 
slowly being reduced, which should open the way for increased competition in both the 
wholesale and retail markets. By 2004, the European Commission had launched an 
infringement procedure with the purpose of ending the “privileged rights to PPC for the 
exploitation of lignite in Greece, therefore creating inequality between economic operators”.52 
However, more than 15 years later, the case remains open, albeit less relevant given the plans 
for swift lignite phase-out included in the NECP, the European Green Deal and current (and 
future) prices of CO2. Following a failed attempt in 2019 to divest lignite-fired power plants and 
mines, Greece has engaged in discussions with DG Competition of the European Commission 
 
48 European Commission (2020), Enhanced Surveillance Report – Greece, Institutional Paper 123, February 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip123_en_0.pdf). 
49 Though ‘At the wholesale level, PPC is still responsible for about 70% of generation, excluding renewable energy 
sources which do no exert competitive pressure on the wholesale market as they benefit from priority dispatch;’ 
see European Commission (2019). Enhanced Surveillance Report – Greece, Institutional Paper 116, November  
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip116_en.pdf). 
50 European Commission (2019), Commission Recommendation on the draft National Energy and Climate Plan of 
Greece covering the period 2021-2-3, SWD (2019) 261 final (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ 
ener/files/documents/gr_rec_en.pdf). 
51 E. Diamantopoulou (2019), “The capacity mechanism Greece wants is a boon for fossil fuels”, ClientEarth  
(https://www.clientearth.org/the-capacity-mechanism-greece-wants-is-a-boon-for-fossil-fuels/). 
52 European Commission, Antitrust/Cartel cases (https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm 
?proc_code=1_38700) The most recent decision on this case was issued in 2018 ‘CASE AT.38700 – Greek lignite 
and electricity markets’ (https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38700/38700_2053_3.pdf). 
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on a proposal for alternative remedies.53 In the gas market, the Public Gas Corporation of 
Greece (DEPA) has been broken down in order to follow transmission unbundling legislation; in 
line with MoU recommendations, the pre-existing monopolies in gas retail were abolished in 
2018 and unbundling of distribution activities has been achieved.  
The recent final Greek NECP may also signal a change in perspective, namely through the 
commitments to the implementation of the EU energy acquis. As well as plans for increasing 
the uptake of RES generation through both ambitious targets and simplified procedures for the 
licensing of new capacities, it is also committing to a coal phase-out calendar. Initially, Greek 
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis pledged to phase out all coal-powered electricity production 
by 2028. The Greek NECP suggests leaving only 660 MW in lignite capacity after 2023. Alongside 
the plans for new interconnectors and renewables development, more recent developments 
reveal a significant change of pace regarding decarbonisation.   
Wholesale markets 
The design of energy markets around the principles of liberalisation and implementation of the 
target models only began in earnest in 2017. Currently, transactions are conducted exclusively 
through the mandatory pool system. There are concerns about the transparency and 
supervision of future over-the-counter (OTC) transactions, which currently represent the 
majority of sales in other member states.54 At the proposal of the Regulatory Authority for 
Energy (RAE), the national regulator, the new Hellenic Energy Exchange, was established in 
2018. This was expected to operate the derivatives, day-ahead and intra-day market by April 
2019 but was delayed. Additionally, the TSO was expected to be responsible for the balancing 
market, which is also pending.  
Therefore, the existing mandatory pool model is yet to be replaced by the target model.55 So 
far, compulsory auctions of electricity have been obligatory under the mandatory pool model 
for any participant wanting to be active in the wholesale market. In view of the lack of properly 
functioning markets, the transitory flexible remuneration mechanism (TFRM) compensated the 
provision of flexibility services until the suspension of the mechanism at the end of March 2019, 
precisely because Greece had failed to implement the target model in a timely way. Given that 
these services are still not being remunerated from the market, the Greek authorities are in the 
process of recommencing the scheme as soon as possible.56 This is likely to continue to function 
during the early implementation of the target model to allow participants a period of 
adjustment.  
 
53 See European Commission (2019). Enhanced Surveillance Report – Greece, Institutional Paper 116, op.cit. 
54 See The Hellenic Power Exchange, Institute of Energy for South-East Europe (https://www.iene.eu/the-hellenic-
power-exchange-p4548.html). 
55 IENE (2019) ‘The Greek Energy Sector: Annual Report 2019’, Institute of Energy for South-East Europe 
(https://www.iene.eu/articlefiles/executive%20summary%201.pdf). 
56 https://energypress.eu/tag/flexibility-mechanism/ 
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The functioning of the wholesale market may have also been hampered by the practices of PPC. 
Given PPC’s ‘net-buyer’ position in the market – its retail share by far exceeds its own 
generation and imports – and taking advantage of its market dominance, the company prevents 
scarcity pricing and influences wholesale prices.57 PPC also continues to exert significant 
pressure on ADMIE, the Greek independent power transmission operator, even after having  
agreed in 2017 to transfer 51% of its stake in the company. Additionally, PPC continues 
operation of certain lignite-fired plants in apparent violation of the emission limits set by the 
Industrial Emissions Directive (2010/75/EU).58 In 2018 and 2019, negotiations were held for the 
privatisation of some of PPC’s lignite generation assets, in order to increase the competition in 
the wholesale and retail market in implementation of the Commission’s antitrust Decision of 5 
March 2008.59 Greece is currently negotiating with the Commission’s DG Competition on 
alternative proposed remedies. 
In the natural gas sector, the Greek market still functions through the execution of bilateral 
contracts between the suppliers importing natural gas. Since the execution of the 
interconnection agreement between DESFA and Bulgartransgaz in 2016, the market gradually 
opened up to competition and is no longer dominated by the historical incumbent DEPA. In 
2016, DEPA imported 90% of the total natural gas in Greece, share which has now dropped to 
roughly 30%. Law 4425/2016 established the basic principles of wholesale market with 
developed spot, day-ahead and forward markets,60 and set the responsibilities of the 
operators, but they are not yet operational. The recent expansion of the Revithoussa LNG 
Terminal61 has allowed further development of liquidity and competition in the wholesale 
market.62 
Retail markets 
In theory, electricity consumers have been able to choose between alternative suppliers since 
2007. However, the market remains highly concentrated – PPC currently amounts to about 70% 
of the retail market, with the remaining market share being split between 25 private 
 
57 A. Dagoumas (2019), “Impact of Bilateral Contracts on Wholesale Electricity Markets: In a Case Where a Market 
Participant has Dominant Position”, Applied Science, Vol. 9, pp. 382-393. 
58 Letter of Formal Notice addressed to Greece by the Commission in July 2019. 
59 COMP AT 38700 and court case T-169/08RENV. 
60 RAE (2019) ‘National report 2018’ (http://rae.gr/site/file/system/docs/ActionReports/national_2018).  
61 DESFA (2018), “Greece is becoming a gas hub in Southeastern Europe by inaugurating the upgrade of the LNG 
Terminal Station in Revithoussa”, 22 November (https://www.desfa.gr/en/press-center/press-releases/h-ellada-
anadeiknyetai-se-kombo-fysikoy-aerioy-gia-th-notioanatolikh-eyrwph-me-thn-egkainiash-ths-anaba8mishs-toy-
termatikoy-sta8moy-yfa-sth-reby8oysa). 
62 P. Sykes (2019), “INTERACTIVE: Greece's MYTILINEOS leapfrogs incumbent DEPA as top LNG buyer”, ICIS, 6 
August (https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2019/08/06/10401426/interactive-greece-s-mytilineos-
leapfrogs-incumbent-depa-as-top-lng-buyer); Stuart Elliot (2020), “Low LNG prices lead to major shift in Greek gas 
market dynamics: DEPA”, S&P Global Platts, 21 April (https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-
news/natural-gas/042120-low-lng-prices-lead-to-major-shift-in-greek-gas-market-dynamics-depa).  
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companies.63 PPC has allegedly cross-subsidised its low-voltage consumers, mainly consisting 
of households and small businesses, by passing costs to medium and high-voltage consumers.64 
The company also needs to recuperate over €2.3 billion in debt from its customers, €1.7 billion 
of which is owed by the low-voltage consumers.65 The market dominance of PPC, its alleged 
practices of keeping prices artificially low for household consumers, in addition to a history of 
regulated tariffs and other state interventions aimed at preventing price hikes for consumers, 
have stalled the emergence of significant competitors in the retail market.  
To address this problem, the NOME system of auctions was introduced in 2016; this obliged 
PPC to sell, via auctions, electricity produced from its lignite and hydropower capacities to its 
competitors at prices reflecting the costs of production to mitigate exclusive access of PPC to a 
diversified generation portfolio and introduce a hedging tool for suppliers. The goal of this 
system was to reduce the share of PPC from over 95% in 2015 to 50% in 2020. The NOME 
system of auctions has indeed resulted in PPC’s retail market share dropping considerably – it 
is currently at about 70% – but is unlikely to be achieving the objective of the implemented 
interim measure.66 The NOME auctions were abolished by the Greek Government in autumn 
2019; nonetheless, owing to the evolution of CO2 and gas prices and the corresponding drop in 
system marginal prices, the NOME products currently appear far less appealing to suppliers.  
When it comes to natural gas, from 2017 the three regional integrated distribution and supply 
companies have separated their operations as a result of unbundling requirements. The 
monopolies of EPA Attikis and EPA THESS were lifted in 2018 to allow retail customers to freely 
choose suppliers in three Greek regions. Nonetheless, the incumbents still hold a dominant 
position in the retail market and in the rest of the country there is no retail market competition. 
The majority of these consumers are supplied with natural gas by the DEPA company, which 
has complete monopoly in the areas where it operates. Competitive retail markets are 
regionally restricted and full unbundling is slow to materialise. Price regulations also continue 
to exist. Under the universal service obligation, regulated tariffs are offered to consumers that 
have either not chosen a supplier or are unable to conclude a contract because of poor 
payment record. As a result, consumers pay distorted prices through the application of social 
tariffs established (in theory) to address energy poverty concerns.67  
 
63 The five larger independent suppliers represent roughly 20% of the retail market. 
64 N. Danias, J. Swales, P. McGregor (2013), “The Greek Electricity Market Reforms: Political and Regulatory 
Considerations”, Energy Policy, Vol. 63, pp. 1040-1047. 
65 EnergyPress (2018), “European Commission advises PPC to intensify debt hunt”, 22 November 
(https://energypress.eu/european-commission-advises-ppc-to-intensify-unpaid-receivables-hunt/). 
66 The success of the NOME system of auctions in bringing down PPC’s market share was partly compromised by the 
export of significant volumes of NOME-bought electricity, PPC’s tariff policy, including aggressive discounts and state 
introduced ‘distortive’ supplier charges aimed at preventing the increase of the RES levy paid by consumers; said 
suppliers’ uplifts were not passed on to consumers by PPC, thus further eliminating its own margins and those of 
competitors. EnexGroup (2020), “ForwardElectricity Products Auctions Systems. Monthly Wholesale and Retail 
Penetration and Market Share Report”, January (http://www.enexgroup.gr/fileadmin/groups/EDSHE/FEP/ 
MonthlyReports/FEPAS_MonthlyReport_202001_EN_V01.pdf). 
67 Around 29% of end consumers are believed to be in energy poverty. 




In the past, the Greek regulator RAE lacked sufficient power to independently adopt important 
decisions, which were imposed by the government.68 A recent study published by the European 
Commission highlights some concerns that RAE “(systematically) follows guidelines from the 
minister”.69 RAE has been viewed by some local actors as a block to genuine competition in 
Greek energy markets, whereas, in a recently published enhanced surveillance report,70 the 
European Commission raised some concerns about the regulator’s “willingness and capacity to 
oversee market reforms and make the necessary regulatory decisions in a timely and 
transparent manner”. There are discussions about increasing its independence and 
administrative capacity, but concrete measures are still to materialise. 
Interconnectivity and market coupling 
The interconnectivity level in 2017 was 9.3%, with the country being expected to reach the 10% 
interconnectivity target for 2020.71 Currently, Greece imports electricity from Bulgaria, North 
Macedonia, Italy, Turkey and Albania. While some groundwork has been conducted for 
coupling the Greek energy markets with other European countries, this measure has been put 
on hold. Since 2018, the Greek power exchange is part of the price coupling of regions (PCR) 
initiative,72 but the first coupling is not expected before 2020 or even 2021. Italy will be the 
first market that Greece is coupled with, followed by Bulgaria and North Macedonia. Given the 
current capacity deficit, the coupling is an important initiative for increasing competition and 
eventually leading to more market-driven wholesale prices, for the benefit of both consumers 
and producers.  
Building interconnection with its largely autonomous island system is a very important project 
for Greece. The target is for all remaining 29 autonomous island electricity systems to be 
connected to the national grid. The Greek TSO plans to interconnect all islands by 2030, but 
some domestic actors argue that these projects could be completed by 2026. 
Given the dependence on imports for its internal natural gas consumption, Greece already has 
a strong network of natural gas interconnections. Recent attempts at regional cooperation are 
 
68 N. Danias, J. Swales, and P. McGregor (2013), op. cit. 
69 European Commission (2019), “Assessing the independence and effectiveness of national regulatory authorities 
in the field of energy” (https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e5f886d6-917d-11e9-9369-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en). 
70 European Commission (2019), Enhanced Surveillance Report – Greece, Institutional Paper 103, June  
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip103_en.pdf). 
71 European Commission (2019), Assessment of the National Energy and Climate Plan of Greece Accompanying 
the document Commission Recommendation on the draft integrated National Energy and Climate Plan of Greece 
covering the period 2021-2030, p. 10, (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/gr_swd_en.pdf). 
72 Price Coupling of Regions is an initiative of seven European power exchanges to develop a single price coupling 
solution for calculating electricity prices across Europe, and for allocating cross-border capacity on a day-ahead basis. 
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contributing to its further development. The new interconnection with Bulgaria, a project that 
had been stuck for 10 years, has been revitalised under the CESEC framework following the 
execution of the interconnection agreement on the existing pipelines in the summer of 2016.73  
To further diversify its sources of supply, Greece is currently working on establishing the 
Hellenic trading point (HTP) for the natural gas market, developing projects for LNG terminals, 
and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that will deliver natural gas from the Caspian Sea. The 
construction of TAP started on the Greek territory in 2016 and is expected to be completed in 
2020.  
Obstacles to implementation 
Greece has been slow to adopt the EU energy market reforms since the early stages of 
liberalisation. To overcome the initial delays and accelerate implementation, specific energy-
related provisions were introduced in the MoU signed with the European Commission in 2015, 
in the context of the ESM stability support programme. One of the objectives of this agreement 
was to “reduce monopolistic rents and inefficiencies, promote innovation, favour a wider 
adoption of renewables and gas, and ensure the transfer of benefits of all these changes to 
consumers”.74 The European Commission 2019 Enhanced Surveillance Report, following the 
completion of the aforementioned memorandum, warned of a slowdown in the adoption of 
market reforms and the subsequent delay in meeting the agreed major commitments.75 The 
Commission’s recommendation on the draft NECP further highlighted the lack of ambition in 
the fields of market integration, market functioning, implementation of target models and the 
reduction of PPC concentration in wholesale and retail markets. Some positive recent steps 
include the fact that ADMIE and the gas TSO and DESFA were partly privatised in 2018. PPC 
agreed in 2015 to both reduce its market dominance and to sell its majority stake in ADMIE.76 
Further privatisations are planned for assets owned by PPC, DEPA and the Hellenic Petroleum 
Group.77 The Mitsotakis government has stated it will progressively address remaining 
obstacles.  
 
73 Lngunlimited (2020), op. cit.  
74 ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission acting on behalf of the European Stability 
Mechanism and the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece’ (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ 
01_mou_20150811_en1.pdf),  p. 25. 
75 European Commission (2019), Enhanced Surveillance Report – Greece, February 2019 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip103_en.pdf) p. 57.  
76 See SouthEUSummit (2017), “Greece’s Largest Electric Power Company Revamps its Business Structure from 
Monopoly to Competitive Market Player”, 14 December (https://www.southeusummit.com/europe/greeces-
largest-electric-power-company-revamps-business-structure-monopoly-competitive-market-player/). 
77 HAEE (2019), “Greek Energy Market Report 2019” (https://www.haee.gr/media/4858/haees-greek-energy-
market-report-2019-upload-version.pdf). 
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5. Romania 
As with other countries in the region, the liberalisation of the Romanian energy markets has 
been a slow process. In 2012 plans were laid out to liberalise wholesale gas prices by 2015, with 
the residential sector continuing to have a certain degree of regulated prices until 2021. The 
electricity market was reformed as of 2018 and regulated tariffs were eliminated in the 
wholesale market following a liberalisation calendar adopted in 2012.78 The country has a 
functional centralised market for bilateral contract, day-ahead, intra-day and the balancing 
market. The electricity market is fairly competitive, with a wide range of electricity producers 
from which suppliers can buy in a competitive setting, although the majority of producers are 
state-owned companies and numerous household consumers are still covered by regulated 
tariffs if they have not opted to participate in the competitive market. 
The evolution of the natural gas market towards liberalisation has been more difficult. While 
imports are needed for only 15% of demand, two companies – OMV Petrom and Romgaz – 
dominate the wholesale market with 95% of domestic production. Gas is supplied in both 
regulated and competitive market segments. Romania was meant to follow a schedule for the 
complete liberalisation of its natural gas market, but the process has been suspended for three 
years, halted by the Governmental Emergency Ordinance (GEO) 114/2018. This measure, which 
also affects the electricity market, introduced a 2% turnover tax on energy companies, put a 
price cap on domestically produced gas, and reintroduced regulated prices for three years from 
March 2019.   
The measures have been recently revised as a result of a change of government, but the effects 
of the Ordinance had already caused both the liberalisation measures that came into force in 
2017 to regress and severe delays in market liberalisation. According to the recent revision, the 
electricity markets will be fully liberalised as of 1 January 2021 and the gas market from 1 July 
2020. The Romanian government also plans to define the vulnerable consumer and propose a 
support mechanism until the end of 2020, to enable the full market liberalisation.  
Romania is also home to the biggest onshore wind farm in the EU and generally has good 
potential for offshore,79 possibly in the Black Sea, according to the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA), in addition to significant potential for solar PV installations, including 
in coal regions.  
Wholesale markets 
 
78 The liberalisation measures contained a combination of regulated prices and quantities set by the Romanian 
NRA, as well as a competitive market component. For a more detailed explanation see Andrei Covatariu (2016), 
“The household energy market in Romania is in a process of liberalization. Or is it?”, Energy Policy Group, March 
(https://www.enpg.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/EPG_2016-03-15_Andrei-Covatariu_The-household-
energy-market-liberalization-process.pdf). 
79 Recently, Romanian Hidroelectrica has announced its long-term plan to enhance renewable development, 
among others offshore wind to reach 300 MW capacity by 2026. 
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The wholesale electricity markets are competitive and benefit from the participation of a wide 
range of producers. Three state-owned companies, Hidroelectrica, CE Oltenia and 
Nuclearelectrica, together provide approximately 69% of the electricity produced. Regulated 
wholesale market prices were phased out from the beginning of 2018. There are problems, 
however, with the available production capacities. On paper, Romania has over 24 GW of 
installed capacity, but the real net power generation capacity is more likely to be around 11 
GW, given the large chunks of installed capacity that are either completely or largely 
unavailable.80 The National Energy Regulatory Authority (NERA) is currently reviewing the 
licences for available capacities, having already identified more than 8 GW that are not 
physically available, and removed licences for 3.8 GW.81 The vulnerability and price exposure 
of the current system were revealed in September 2019, when a nuclear reactor had to be 
temporarily shut down for unforeseen repair works. Both the daily and day-ahead prices 
skyrocketed to twice the value of the price-coupled markets of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. 
All trades in wholesale markets must currently be conducted through the centralised exchange. 
Transactions are organised through the centralised market for bilateral contract, the day-ahead 
market, the intra-day market, the balancing market, the centralised market for universal service 
and the technological system services market. The predominant trading is done on centralised 
bilateral electricity contract markets organised on the OPCOM platform, followed by the day-
ahead market.82 A downside of this obligation to only trade electricity through the centralised 
market is that no power purchase agreements (PPAs) could be established. This represents a 
barrier to investors in new renewables capacities and a conflict with the EU Electricity 
Regulation, which entered into force in 2020. This situation is in the process of being revised 
through a new governmental emergency ordinance.  
In contrast, the natural gas wholesale market is characterised by very low liquidity, even though 
gas can be traded on three separate platforms, namely OPCOM, BRM and STEG. There are eight 
domestic producers, but as previously mentioned, 95% of the domestic production is 
dominated by two companies. GEO 114/2018, which introduced regulated tariffs and a 2% tax 
on energy companies’ turnover, was one of the main causes for an indefinite suspension of the 
exploration of the Neptun Deep project, a large deepwater gas reservoir. ExxonMobil, the 
cooperator of this field, is reported to be seeking to abandon the project.83 At least part of its 
 
80 The precise numbers are still unknown. The national regulatory agency has, however, already started eliminating 
licences for inexistent capacities. See https://financialintelligence.ro/anre-va-retrage-in-acest-an-licentele-de-
producere-a-energiei-pentru-capacitati-de-3-800-de-megawati/. 
81 A. Mosoianu (2019), “Statul a lansat demontarea "ficțiunilor" din sistemul energetic românesc. ANRE a șters din 
statistici capacități de producție disponibile de peste 400 MW", (https://www.profit.ro/povesti-cu-profit/ 
energie/statul-a-lansat-demontarea-fictiunilor-din-sistemul-energetic-romanesc-anre-a-sters-din-statistici-
capacitati-de-productie-indisponibile-de-peste-400-mw-19136787). 
82 NERA (2019), ‘National Report 2018’ (https://www.ceer.eu/documents/104400/6693346/C19_NR_Romania-
EN-Summary.pdf/563d871e-a29e-9998-f847-c05137da019c). 
83 R. Dudau and M Catuti (2019), “The Decarbonisation Challenge of Southeast Europe: A Case Study of Romania”, 
Intereconomics, Vol. 6, No.54, pp. 341-346.  
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share in the reservoir is likely to be purchased by one of the two domestic giants. According to 
a recent decision by the national regulator, OMV Petrom and Romgaz will be obliged to auction, 
through monthly offers, 30% of their production over the next three years through the 
centralised markets.84  
From 1 April 2017 the sale price for the natural gas from domestic production was liberalised, 
within the competitive market. However, the wholesale market showcases poor liquidity. The 
price cap of 68 RON/MWh (approximately €14.5 /MWh), introduced through GEO114/2018 for 
a substantial part of the volumes traded on the wholesale gas market, only further hindered 
the development of the centralised market, thereby further consolidating the lack of liquidity.85 
As the cap only restricted domestically produced natural gas, it also led to a sudden increase in 
imports.  
Retail markets 
Romania was the first country in the region to liberalise the electricity market for all consumers. 
Since 2018, no more household price regulations have been permitted by NERA. This was the 
result of a long deregulation process that started in 2007. For non-household consumers, the 
prices have been liberalised since 2014 and for household consumers since 2018. Nonetheless, 
consumers can still use the universal service market, irrespective of whether they have 
previously participated in the competitive market or not. This system was outlined in the 2012 
Memorandum, which established a roadmap for the elimination of regulated tariffs until 2018. 
There are two types of suppliers of last resort-bound suppliers, one for each grid area, and 
optional suppliers, of which there can be an unlimited number.86 For each grid, NERA calculates 
the maximum price for the universal service provided by the suppliers of last resort.  
About 7.5 million consumers are currently covered by the universal service regime, a number 
that has been steadily diminishing. These are consumers that have not secured supply from a 
competitive source. According to NERA, there are 97 licensed electricity suppliers, of which five 
are suppliers of last resort. The largest supplier has a market share of 17%. Of those suppliers 
of last resort, four of them (Enel, Electrica, CEZ and E.ON) have accumulated financial losses of 
over €50 million, to be recuperated from the consumers through bills by 30 June 2020.87 
Suppliers of last resort received a proportion of the electricity at fixed prices from 





85 Emerton (2019), “The Natural Gas Market in Romania: how do we guarantee the security and competitiveness of 
the sector”, May (http://www.emerton.co/app/uploads/2019/09/Studiu_GasMarketDesign-Emerton_ENG.pdf). 
86 NERA (2019) ‘National Report 2018’ (https://www.ceer.eu/documents/104400/6693346/C19_NR_Romania-
EN-Summary.pdf/563d871e-a29e-9998-f847-c05137da019c). 
87 M. Nicut (2019), “Legea energiei electrice și a gazelor se schimbă. Iată modificările, punct cu punct – proiect” 
Energia.ro, (https://e-nergia.ro/exclusiv-legea-energiei-electrice-si-a-gazelor-se-schimba-iata-modificarile-punct-
cu-punct-proiect/). 
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market. Given the earlier liberalisation of the wholesale market, the suppliers of last resort 
could not buy sufficiently cheap electricity on the competitive market to be able to meet the 
prices established by NERA for the universal service, so they accumulated losses.   
Natural gas supply is conducted through both liberalised and regulated markets, which have 
different degrees of concentration. As with the electricity market, according to the Law on 
Electricity and Natural Gas no. 123/2012, as amended and supplemented, the Romanian 
natural gas sector is structured as two segments: the regulated market and the competitive 
market. Since 1 January 2015, the domestic gas market has been completely liberalised for non-
household customers, but not for households. In the liberalised segment, four companies 
control 70% of the market share, while 90% of the regulated market is controlled by two 
companies. There are 80 registered suppliers, 35 of which are active on the regulated market. 
In 2018, there were 424,387 consumers supplied in a competitive regime, out of more than 3.8 
million total final consumers.  
In Romania there are still no adequate targeted measures for protecting vulnerable consumers, 
which are necessary for allowing the full elimination of regulated prices. The national regulator 
introduced some stipulations at the end of 2019 through the 235/2019 Ordinance, created to 
establish which consumers are vulnerable based on income and health or old age. According 
to the modification of GEO 114, the government should provide a framework for dealing with 
the vulnerable consumer and the means of finance by 31 December 2020.  
NRA independence 
NERA, the Romanian national regulatory authority, conducts its activity under parliamentary 
control but is self-financed through a revenue tax on energy companies. Recently, there has 
been a call by Romanian and international market participants to investigate the independence 
of the NRA.88 The agency was accused of being prone to political interference and following 
direct instructions from the government. One example is the market-distorting GEO 114/2018. 
This contravenes EU legislation, but NERA implemented it nonetheless and collected significant 
tax revenues as a result of the 2% tax on the revenues of energy companies. The government 
has since stripped NERA of the revenue collected from this tax. 
Interconnectivity and market coupling 
Romania and Slovenia are the only SEE countries that are integrated into the European power 
market. The day-ahead market has been coupled since 2014 with the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary under the 4M Market Coupling project. The current interconnection capacity of 
Romania is 7%, and is expected to increase beyond 9% by 2020, thereby nearing the 10% 
objective. 
 
88 A. Sabadus (2019), “Romanian regulator faces political influence claims”, ICIS, 6 November 
(https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2019/11/06/10440676/exclusive-romanian-regulator-faces-
political-influence-claims). 
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Meanwhile, the Romanian gas market is relatively isolated. While the national gas network is 
interconnected with Hungary, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine, only 15% of the country’s 
interconnection capacity is with other EU member states. In 2017, a stress test conducted by 
ENTSOG showed that the Romanian gas market is one of the most vulnerable in the EU if 
Russian gas supplies are disrupted. The export capacity is almost non-existent.  
While plans for multiple additional interconnectors exist, few are being developed on the 
ground.89 One example is the BRUA gas corridor, linking Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and 
Austria, that is currently being developed as part of the third list of Projects of Common Interest 
(PCIs) of the European Commission. However, without the extraction of natural gas from the 
Black Sea, the pipeline’s export capacity will remain underused and essentially marginal. 
Obstacles to implementation 
Besides the requirements of EU legislation, Romania committed itself, through the 2012 
Memorandum established with the EU, the World Bank and the IMF, to follow a timetable for 
eliminating regulated gas prices by 2015 for non-household consumers and by 2018 for 
household consumers. Regardless, in 2014 it decided unilaterally to postpone the gas market 
liberalisation until 2021. A new calendar was sent to the Commission, but less than a year later, 
the government completely froze the liberalisation process through GEO 114/2018. This led to 
the Commission launching an infringement procedure against the price caps and obligations 
imposed on producers to sell at regulated prices. Consequently, the process of liberalisation 
has been relaunched, with a proposal of a new phase-out calendar of regulated prices. 
6. The way forward: a deal between the EU and the SEE through a new 
framework for regional cooperation? 
The implementation of the European Green Deal will require some sort of regional cross-border 
approach. The potential for successful cooperation seems possible, judging from progress 
achieved in market organisation and regulation and through initiatives such as CESEC. The 
cooperation clause under the Governance Regulation will provide additional impetus, 
especially as, to date, the neighbourhood rivalry mentality still remains an obstacle to 
cooperation and cooperative planning. A climate-neutral continent will require, by definition, 
cooperation between the EU, the Energy Community and neighbouring countries such as 
Turkey. Climate neutrality over time will also raise the issue of (regional) carbon leakage.90 A 
regional approach is important to ensure that the transition occurs simultaneously throughout 
the region in order to avoid, for example, the risk that more ambitious countries replace 
domestic higher carbon electricity production with other carbon-intensive imports from 
neighbours.  
 
89 J. Bowden (2019), op.cit. 
90 For example, increased electricity imports from Turkey and western Balkan countries. 
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The potential for renewable energy in southeast Europe, including the wider Black Sea region, 
has been repeatedly documented, for example by IRENA and the World Bank.91 At the same 
time, there is ample of evidence that a combination of energy shortcomings and in particular 
electricity market organisation and regulation – and sometimes the lack of political will – has 
posed unsurmountable barriers to the decarbonisation of the energy mix, for example the 
integration of renewables, energy efficiency, storage solutions or nuclear. The persistent 
challenge overall is the lack of regional strategies and the competition for regional leadership, 
especially since only limited high-level interactions have been present in the region. CESEC has 
achieved several significant regional goals and this may indicate an appetite for bringing more 
interested parties together to overcome the adversarial mentality in the region. A potential 
expansion of the initiative beyond EU borders, for example Black Sea offshore renewables 
development, possibly alongside hydrogen or electricity grids, may become a crucial political 
platform for further enhancing the dialogue for strategic steering and policy guidance, along 
decarbonisation objectives. The experience from existing regional initiatives can be used to 
further promote market opening and better prepare the region for the energy and climate 
transition.  
The energy transition should be not only target- but also business-driven, through the 
meaningful mobilisation of private investment. This would require substituting the 
‘compensation’ discourse prevalent in the region’s transition discussion with a discourse on 
opportunity, for example around low-carbon value chains such as renewables, storage, 
hydrogen and IT. This could be helped by a greater involvement of regional businesses in the 
negotiations and discussions at the EU level. Results from the CESEC initiative were facilitated 
when private companies and other non-state stakeholders were invited to actively coordinate 
with the European Commission to overcome long-persisting regulatory and market 
deficiencies. Active participation of civil society in this process is equally important. Non-
governmental actors are essential to drive stakeholder engagement. Participatory processes 
related to the National Climate and Energy Plan could become a vehicle to achieve this. 
The potential EU climate-neutrality target for 2050 is unprecedentedly ambitious, especially for 
this region. While all member states will face challenges in delivering the required 
transformational changes under the European Green Deal, it would do well for the EU to 
continue paying special attention to the SEE region. Given the different starting points of these 
countries, the state of the market and their political discourses, actual and practical solutions 
are needed for overcoming the existing energy market dysfunctionalities.  
A revised high-level initiative such as CESEC might be able to provide the organisational 
structure for additional regional efforts. Such an initiative may lay the conditions for a ‘New 
Deal’ between the EU and the Energy Community member states for a future-proof sustainable 
future. Such a deal would require tailor-made solutions jointly developed by the governments 
in the region and the European Commission, to be implemented as part of ‘EU Next 
 
91 See for example: IRENA (2019), “Renewable Energy Market Analysis. Southeast Europe”, IRENA, Abu Dabi, 
(https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Dec/IRENA_Market_Analysis_SEE_2019.pdf). 
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Generation’. For this to become real, efficient energy markets will be a precondition, even if it 
may be necessary to take into account the specificities of these markets as described above.  
Additional leverage is provided by the Covid-19 recovery funds. A larger Just Transition Fund 
should be able to provide necessary support – both financial and know-how – for overcoming 
the challenges faced by SEE and other member states in their efforts to grow their economies 
in future low-carbon value chains.  
A systematic engagement with SEE countries, possibly within CESEC, might be the best way to 
embed the transition to the low-carbon economy in the region, thereby accelerating the entire 
EU decarbonisation effort and realising the huge untapped potential that exists in this part of 
Europe. This could, for example, include regular meetings of the regulators and TSOs in the 
three countries and the wider region, the EU, the Energy Community and beyond. The process 
could start with general coordination meetings or analysis such as joint-demand forecasts to 
create transparency and understanding. Facilitated by the European Commission, it might gain 
as much appeal as CESEC. It could build on specific projects such as the development of the 
regional renewable energy potential, for example in the Black Sea, or infrastructure projects 
for electricity and hydrogen. A semi-formal structure could develop into a driver for regional 
integration within the EU and the Energy Community as well with other neighbouring countries. 
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